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Abstract: 
Understanding what drives the changes in current accounts is one of the most important 
macroeconomic issues for developing countries. Excessive surpluses in current accounts 
can trigger trade wars, and excessive deficits in current accounts can, on the other hand, 
induce currency crises. The Glick-Rogoff (1995, Journal of Monetary Economics) model, 
which emphasizes productivity shocks at home and in the world, fit well with developed 
economies in the 1970s and 1980s. However, the Glick-Rogoff model fits poorly when it 
is applied to fast-growing BRICS countries for the period including the global financial 
crisis. We conclude that different mechanisms of current accounts work for developed 
and developing countries. 
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1. Introduction 
Understanding what drives the changes in current accounts is one of the most 
important macroeconomic issues for developing countries. Excessive surplus in a current 
account can trigger trade wars, and excessive deficits in the current account can lead to 
currency crises. For example, Brazil’s current account has frequently fallen into a deficit 
since the 1990s, and India experienced a current account deficit of 91 billion US dollars 
in 2012, whereas China’s current account surplus has become the world’s largest (see 
Figure 1). 
The current trade war between the US and China began under the administration 
of President Trump following a decade in which the US’s bilateral trade deficit with China 
remained large. Against the backdrop of the worldwide effort being made to reduce tariff 
and nontariff barriers, the US raised the tariffs for steel products and thousands of 
products in other industries from China in consecutive sequences starting in 2018, and 
China responded with retaliatory tariff increases. 
 Currency crises are, in many cases, preceded by a current account deficit. 
Obstfeld (2012) documents that many crises have been preceded by a large current 
account deficit, pointing out the crises of Chile in 1981, Finland in 1991, Mexico in 1994, 
and Thailand in 1997, which subsequently led to the outbreak of the Asian currency crisis. 
It should be noted that current account deficits are not a prerequisite for currency crises. 
However, as shown in previous studies, a current account deficit is considered an 
important warning signal of consequent crises. Roy and Kemme (2011) and Catao and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2014) find that current accounts are a powerful predictor of crisis; a 
higher current account deficit position is associated with a higher risk of crisis. During 
the Asian currency crisis, Corsetti et al. (1999) pointed to Taiwan’s current account 
surplus as what prevented contagion from neighboring countries. Davis et al. (2016) show 
that a higher private sector debt increases the probability of a crisis, especially when the 
current account is in a sizable deficit. Observing trade balance as a key determinant of 
current accounts, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) also conclude that exports often 
decrease just before a crisis. 
Among other current account models, Glick and Rogoff (1995) developed an 
empirical model of current accounts to highlight the relationship of productivity with 
investment and current accounts. Current account changes are explained by country-
specific productivity shocks, global productivity shocks, and lagged investments. The 
model performs surprisingly well with G7 data during 1975-1990. Their results show that 
current accounts had a negative response only to country-specific shocks, whereas 
investment showed a positive response to both global and country-specific productivity 
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shocks. 
In this study, we revisit Glick-Rogoff’s model, in which productivity shocks act 
as a key driver of current account changes, and apply the model to the BRICS countries. 
This study aims to contribute to the literature by having the following goals. First, a model 
that emphasizes productivity shocks should be tested against fast-growing countries such 
as the BRICS countries. The BRICS countries experience much-more-volatile 
productivity shocks than developed countries in the G7 do. Second, understanding the 
current account changes of the largest economies is important for the surveillance of the 
global economy. In addition to having knowledge of the G7 countries, understanding the 
BRICS countries’ current account movements, including the world’s second largest 
economy, is essential for policymakers to adopt appropriate macroeconomic policies.  
The results of the empirical application of the Glick-Rogoff model to BRICS 
countries show that the empirical model with productivity shocks works relatively well 
for developing countries except for Russia. However, the empirical Glick-Rogoff model 
collapses when the sample is extended to cover the post-crisis period. The fitness of 
regression in terms of adjusted R-squared becomes close to zero. Following the recent 
development of the empirical current account literature, we extended the Glick-Rogoff 
model with five macroeconomic variables, namely, financial deepening, old dependency 
ratio, young dependency ratio, net foreign assets, and trade openness. The results of the 
extended model improve the fitness of regression for the pre-crisis period in India, China, 
and South Africa by more than ten percent and that in Brazil by two-fold1. Interestingly, 
the modified model even works well during the sample including the post-crisis period 
for Brazil, China, and Russia. 
From the empirical investigations in this paper, we obtained the following 
conclusions for developing countries. (i) Productivity is only important in non-turbulent 
environments. The Glick-Rogoff model performs well in the period prior to the global 
financial crisis but loses all explanatory power in the sample period, which includes the 
global financial crisis. (ii) Other macroeconomic variables are important determinants 
regardless of the inclusion of the crisis in the sample period. Additional five 
macroeconomic variables in the modified Glick-Rogoff model improved the fitness of 
regression in both samples. 
In comparison with developed countries, we also find the following implications. 
(iii) Productivity shocks explain the movements of the current account better for 
developing countries than for developed countries. (iv) However, productivity shocks 
                                                       
1 The extended model cannot be applied to Russia for the pre-crisis period due to the 
lack of data availability. 
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retain some explanatory power for the current account of developed countries even in the 
post-crisis period, whereas productivity shocks have no effect on the current account of 
developing countries in the post-crisis period. (v) Inclusion of macroeconomic variables 
sometimes deteriorates the performance of the current account regression of developed 
countries, especially for euro countries. 
 The construction of the rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
theoretical model of Glick and Rogoff (1995) and the subsequent developments of both 
theoretical and empirical studies. Section 3 examines the empirical application of the 
Glick-Rogoff model and its modified model with macroeconomic variables as controls to 
the BRICS countries. Section 4 compares the results of the BIRCS countries with those 
of the G7 countries and discusses the characteristics of the current account for fast-
growing emerging economies. Section 5 discusses how the five macroeconomic variables 
used in this empirical study are related to other macroeconomic variables used in the 
literature. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Productivity shocks and current accounts 
 Glick and Rogoff (1995) introduced a theoretical small-country model in which 
productivity shocks play crucial roles in determining current account movements. The 
next subsection briefly reviews the assumptions and underlying structure of their model. 
We discuss the applicability of the model assumptions that may lead to the 
misspecification of the empirical model for developing countries in subsection 2-2. 
 
2-1. Glick-Rogoff small-country model with adjustment costs to investment2 
 A small country faces both country-specific productivity shocks and global 
productivity shocks. Global productivity shock can be mitigated by trading global bonds 
in the world capital market at the riskless gross world interest rate r. However, the 
representative agent in each country cannot diversify country-specific shocks. The 
representative firm chooses the path of investments to maximize the present discounted 
value of future profits under the given aggregate output (1) 3 . Taking a linear 
approximation to the first-order condition yields equations (2) and (3). 
                                                       
2 This subsection closely follows the work of Glick and Rogoff (1995), with special 
focus on productivity shocks on current accounts. For the complete derivations of 
equation (8), please refer to the appendix of their original work. See also Marquesz 
(2004) and Bussiere et al. (2010) for another extension of the Glick-Rogoff model. 
3 Global productivity, WtA , is introduced multiplicatively to the aggregate output in a 
similar manner as country-specific productivity.    
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In equation (3), the first term captures the past investment (or lagged productivity shock) 
on the current investment, and the second term captures the impact of revisions in 
expectations about the future path of productivity. 
 The representative agent chooses the path of consumption to maximize the 
present discounted utility (4). 
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Differencing the accounting identity for the current account, we obtain the following 
equation. 
 ( 1)t t t t tCA r F Y I C∆ = − ∆ + ∆ −∆ −∆     (7) 
Combining the equations obtained from maximization for tI∆ , tY∆ , tC∆  with 
equation (7) yields the estimating equation for the current account4. 
 1 1 2 1( 1) ,
c
t t t tCA I A r CAγ γ− −∆ = + ∆ + −     (8) 
                                                       
4 Iα and Kα are marginal production of investment and capital as in equation (2). 1β is 
the autoregressive coefficient of investment in equation (3). The first appearance of 2β is 
omitted in this study, but it is equal to [ / (1 )] 0η λ λ− > . 
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1 1
2 2 1 1
( 1)( 1) 0,
[( 1)( 1) ] / ( ) 0
I K
I K r
γ α β α
γ β α β α β
≡ − − + >
≡ − − − + − <  
If all countries are symmetric in terms of preferences, technology, initial capital stocks, 
and zero initial net foreign asset positions, then the global shock should not affect an 
individual country’s current account because the global shock affects all countries in the 
same manner; therefore, we obtain the final version of the basic Glick-Rogoff model. 
 1 1 2 3 ,
c w
t t t tCA I A Aγ γ γ−∆ = + ∆ + ∆  where 3γ is assumed to be zero. (9) 
In this paper, leaving the investment equation aside, we focus on the effect of 
both country-specific and global productivity shocks on current accounts. The regression 
model derived from the theoretical result of Glick and Rogoff (1995) is as follows. 
1 1 2 3 ,
c w
t t t t tCA I A Aγ γ γ ε−∆ = + ∆ + ∆ +         (10) 
where tCA  is the current account of the home country, 
c
tA is the total factor productivity 
of the home country, 
W
tA is the total factor productivity of the rest of the world, and tI
is the lagged investment in the home country. 
 
2-2. Where can the Glick-Rogoff model go wrong in an application to the BRICS 
countries? 
 The effect of global productivity shocks is assumed to have no effect on a change 
in current accounts, as shown in equation (10). However, there are at least two strong 
arguments against this assumption. For the application to the BRICS countries, there are 
problems with assuming a zero initial net foreign asset position and assuming that global 
productivity shocks affect developed and developing countries equally. 
First, Glick and Rogoff (1995) state that “zero initial net foreign asset positions 
… is a reasonable empirical approximation for the G-7 countries over the sample period.” 
However, if positive (or negative) net foreign asset positions are at a level as high as was 
observed prior to global financial crisis in China, the global productivity shocks affect 
these countries with nonzero net foreign asset positions asymmetrically. 
 Second, we followed Glick and Rogoff (1995) in measuring global productivity 
based on the largest economies of the world. In an application to the G7 countries as in 
Glick and Rogoff (1995), each sample country’s productivity also contributes to the 
global productivity. Therefore, observed country productivity (from the original data) is 
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decomposed into a country-specific component and a global component. The effect of the 
global component of productivity shock is nil because it affects both home country and 
the rest of the world similarly. However, for an application to the developing countries as 
in this study, observed country productivity (from the original data) does not constituent 
global productivity. The global factor should affect the BRICS countries and the rest of 
the world asymmetrically.  
 
 
3. Domestic and Global Productivity 
 In this section, we apply the Glick-Rogoff model to the fast-growing emerging 
economies, namely, the BRICS countries, Brazil, China, India, Russia, and South Africa. 
The key determinants of current account change in the Glick-Rogoff model are global 
and country-specific productivity shocks. To account for the severe negative shocks 
experienced during the global financial crisis, we estimate the model in two sample 
periods; one ending in 2008 and the other ending in 2017. In the second subsection, we 
also apply the extended model with additional macroeconomic variables after we obtain 
the base results from the original Glick-Rogoff model. In next section, we apply the same 
model to developed countries, namely, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, and 
US. We discuss similarities and differences in current account determinants between the 
BRICS and G7 countries. 
 
3-1. Estimation results of the basic Glick-Rogoff model 
 Global productivity is constructed from the weighted average of the 
productivities of the G7 countries, namely, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
UK, and the US. Alternatively, the first principal component of the productivities of the 
G7 countries is also used as a measure of global productivity5. The regression model of 
equation (10) is restated here. 
1 1 2 3 ,
c w
t t t t tCA I A Aγ γ γ ε−∆ = + ∆ + ∆ +  
From the Glick-Rogoff model, the expected sign of the past investment is positive, that 
                                                       
5 Gregory and Head (1999) used dynamic factor analysis to construct a measure of 
common economic activity for the G7 countries. They find that the common economic 
activity has substantial impact on productivity but not on current account. İşcan (2000) 
further disintegrates overall productivity into traded good productivity and nontraded 
good productivity. He finds that the most influential of all on current account is country-
specific traded good productivity. 
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of the first-difference of each country’s productivity is negative, and that of the first-
difference of worldwide productivity is zero; that is, 1 2 30, 0,  and 0γ γ γ> < = . The 
dynamic optimization model of Glick and Rogoff (1995) integrates the endogenous 
decisions of producers and consumers; therefore, the derived parameters of the model are 
affected by several sources. However, if we simply decompose the dependent variable, 
which is the first difference of the current account in terms of private saving and 
investment, and leave aside the government role, we can observe (in the first equality) the 
first-degree importance of the current investment and the past investment on the 
dependent variable. Adjusted for marginal production with respect to investment and 
capital stock, i.e.,  and I Kα α , and the impact of past investment shock on the current 
investment, i.e., 1β , the coefficient of unity in the equation remains positive, 1γ , as 
shown in equation (8). 
 1 1 1( ) ( )t t t t t t t t tCA CA CA S I S I S I− − −∆ ≡ − = − − − = ∆ −∆   (11) 
It is also clear that a change in a country’s productivity negatively affects a change in its 
current account, 2γ , via a change in investment through the second equality. 
 The empirical results of estimating the Glick-Rogoff model for the BRICS 
countries during 1983 – 2008 are provided in Panel 1 of Table 1a & 1b6. The differences 
in the two tables arise from the way the global productivity index is constructed. The 
global productivity index is simply a GDP-weighted average of the G7 countries in Table 
1a and the first principal component of the G7 countries in Table 1b. Country-specific 
productivity is based on total factor productivity, as shown in Figure 2. 
First, by comparing Table 1a and 1b, we find that the results are quite similar in 
terms of both the size of the coefficients and the statistical significance except for the 
coefficient size of global productivity shock. The result of the basic model is robust 
regardless of how global productivity is measured. 
Second, country-specific productivity shock is not statistically significant for all 
BRICS countries, although theory predicts a negative effect on change in the current 
account. This result is quite different from the results obtained for the G7 countries during 
1961-1990 in Glick and Rogoff (1995, Table 3); the estimated coefficients of the country-
                                                       
6 The sample period for Russia only begins in 1995 due to the availability of data. 
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specific productivity shock are negative and statistically significant for five countries, 
namely, the US, Japan, Italy, the UK, and Canada. 
Third, except for Brazil and South Africa (only in Table 1a), the results for global 
productivity shock are consistent with the Glick and Rogoff model. Under the assumption 
that global productivity shock symmetrically affects all countries in the world, the effect 
of global productivity shock on current account change must be equal to zero. The 
estimated coefficients for Russia, India, China, and South Africa (only in Table 1b) are 
not significantly different from zero at the conventional significance level. For the case 
of Brazil, the estimated coefficient is positive and statistically significant. The positive 
sign is consistent if the global productivity shock represents the rest of the world instead 
of the world with Brazil included (see the discussion in subsection 2-2). Foreign 
productivity shock should positively affect home current account change because home 
productivity shock negatively affects home current account change, as in 2γ . 
 The basic Glick-Rogoff model is also estimated for the extended sample of 1983-
2017, including the post global financial crisis period, and the results are provided in 
Panel 2 of Table 1a and 1b. The surprising result is that nothing in the Glick-Rogoff model 
works for the BRICS countries if the worldwide turbulent period is included in the sample. 
For all BRICS counties, the fitness of the regression in terms of adjusted R-squared is 
literally zero. 
 
[insert Table 1a & 1b around here] 
 
The productivity shocks implemented in the preceding empirical approach need 
to meet the requirement assumed in the theoretical model; country-specific productivity 
and global productivity are independent. In the original Glick and Rogoff (1995) study, 
global productivity is constructed from the same countries in the sample; therefore, the 
independent assumption is more likely to be violated if no adjustment is made. Following 
the methodology implemented in Glick and Rogoff (1995), we regressed the original 
country productivity on the global productivity and used the residual as country-specific 
productivity. By design, the independence of country-specific and global productivity 
shock is guaranteed. The results using the residual as country-specific productivity are 
shown in Tables 2a and 2b. 
The estimated results in Tables 2a and 2b are very similar to those of Tables 1a 
and 1b in terms of both the size of coefficients and the statistical significance. The only 
noteworthy point is that the global productivity shock becomes statistically significant for 
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an additional country in the shorter sample. For China in the period between 1983 and 
2008, as seen in Table 2b, the global productivity shock is positive and statistically 
significant at the ten percent level. This is similar to the case of Brazil, in which the 
positive sign indicates foreign productivity shock rather than global productivity shock. 
As for the results of South Africa in Table 2a, it is puzzling that the global productivity 
shock is negative and statistically significant7. 
 
 [insert Table 2a & 2b around here] 
 
3-2. Extended models with other macroeconomic variables 
 Not all empirical models of current account movements emphasize productivity 
shocks. The advantage of the Glick-Rogoff regression model is its concrete derivation 
based on the theoretical dynamic model. However, many researchers have continued to 
explore the possibility of many other macroeconomic variables to explain current account 
movements, frequently without theoretical models. 
Chinn and Prasad (2003) investigated the medium-term determinants of current 
accounts for a large sample of developed and developing countries. They find that current 
account balance is positively correlated with government budget balance and the initial 
level of net foreign assets. Among developing countries, financial deepening is positively 
associated with current account balance, while trade openness is negatively correlated 
with current account balance. 
Cudre and Hoffmann (2017) and Romelli and Terra (2018) also show that trade 
openness is a significant driver of current accounts. Romelli and Terra (2018) investigate 
the impact of trade openness on the relationship between the current account and the real 
exchange rate. They find that during the balance of payment distress episodes, currency 
depreciations are associated with larger improvements in the current accounts of countries 
that are more open to trade, and the magnitude of exchange rate depreciations over the 
adjustment process of current accounts is related to the degree of openness to trade. Cudre 
and Hoffmann (2017) also find that trade openness is an important factor even across 
regions within a nation. 
Following the recent development of the empirical current account literature, we 
extended the Glick-Rogoff model with five macroeconomic variables: financial 
deepening, old dependency ratio, young dependency ratio, net foreign assets, and trade 
                                                       
7 Smit et al. (2014) provide an explanation of the irregular movement of South Africa’s 
current account deficit as being driven by substantial net capital inflows and their 
reversals afterwards. 
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openness8. First, the fitness of regression substantially improved for Brazil, India, and 
China. In the shorter sample between 1983 and 2008, the adjusted R-squared increased 
from 0.29 to 0.60 for Brazil, from 0.60 to 0.69 for India, and from 0.58 to 0.68 for China. 
In the longer sample that included the post-crisis period, the adjusted R-squared values 
were 0.31 for Russia, 0.21 for Brazil, and 0.24 for China; all of these values increased 
from zero or even negative values of the adjusted R-squared in the basic model 
estimations. 
 Second, we obtained estimation results that are consistent with the theoretical 
prediction for country-specific productivity shock although none of the estimates were 
statistically significant in the base model; negative responses are obtained for South 
Africa in the shorter sample and Brazil for the longer sample. In addition, by assuming 
global productivity as foreign productivity, we find a positive association with statistical 
significance between the current account and global productivity for Russia in the longer 
sample in addition to those for Brazil. 
 Third, the importance of additional macroeconomic variables for explaining 
current accounts varies among the BRICS countries. Financial deepening has no 
explanatory power for all countries. The old dependency ratio has a positive effect only 
for Brazil in the longer sample, while the young dependency ratio exerts opposite effects 
on Russia and Brazil in the longer sample. Net foreign assets have a positive effect for 
China in the shorter sample and for Russia in the longer sample. Trade openness has a 
positive effect for South Africa in the shorter sample and China in the longer sample. 
 
[insert Table 3a & 3b around here] 
 
4. Can the same current account model be applied to both developed and developing 
countries? 
 For the BRICS countries, except for Russia, we find that the Glick-Rogoff model 
can explain approximately 20 – 60 percent of the changes in the current account for the 
period between 1983 and 2008; however, productivity shocks completely lose 
explanatory power when the sample is extended to cover the post-crisis period. The 
modified model extended with macroeconomic variables improves the fitness of 
regression for both samples. To conclude, whether these results are general or specific to 
fast-growing developing countries, we need to compare the results with those of 
developed countries. Therefore, we also estimated the same regression models for the G7 
                                                       
8 The definitions and sources of macroeconomic variables are provided in the appendix 
A.   
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countries. The results are shown in appendix Tables C1 and C29. 
 First, the explanatory power of the original Glick-Rogoff model does not work, 
or at least does not work better for G7 countries than for BRICS countries in the pre-crisis 
period. The degree of fitness in terms of adjusted R-squared are 0.16, 0.15, 0.08, and 0.28 
for France, Germany, Italy, and Japan, respectively. It is less than zero for Canada and the 
UK. The only exception is the US; 43 percent of current account movements in the US 
are explained by both global and local productivity shocks and past investment. 
 Second, similar to the BRICS countries, the basic model fits less well for G7 
countries in the post-crisis period. However, unlike the BRICS countries, even in the post-
crisis period, the Glick-Rogoff model retains some explanatory power, at least for Canada, 
Germany, Japan, and the US. This is a surprising finding because developed countries, 
especially the US, are the most affected countries in the world by the global financial 
crisis. We may need to adjust our understanding so that the financial crisis per se does not 
break the relationship between productivity shocks and current account changes. 
 Third, unlike in the case of the BRICS countries, the modified model does not 
necessarily improve the fitness of regressions in terms of the adjusted R-squared. More 
interestingly, the decline in the explanatory power of the overall regression model is found 
only for European countries, more precisely euro countries. For the pre-crisis sample, 
additional macroeconomic variables in France, Germany, and Italy reduced the adjusted 
R-squared from 0.16, 0.15, and 0.08 to 0.12, 0.09, and 0.00, respectively. 
 By comparing the estimated results of the BRICS and G7 countries, we can draw 
the following implications for the movement of current accounts. (i) Productivity shocks 
as determinants of current account movements are more important in developing 
countries. (ii) However, productivity shocks lose their explanatory power for developing 
countries in the midst of the financial crisis. (iii) Demography, net foreign assets, and 
trade openness contribute to the movements of the current account for the BRICS 
countries, but this is less so for the G7 countries and even the opposite for euro countries. 
  
5. Discussions 
 In this study, five macroeconomic variables are selected for the modified Glick-
                                                       
9 These conclusions are drawn from comparing the results in Table 2a (2b) and Table 3a 
(3b). However, the sample periods for the modified model do not exactly match those in 
the basic model due to the exclusion of a few years for missing macroeconomic 
variables. The estimation results in Appendix Tables B1a and B1b with the sample 
period adjusted to match those of Table 3a and 3b confirm that the qualitative results do 
not change.    
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Rogoff model, which examines the effects of productivity shocks on current account 
changes. In the current account literature, researchers tested many more variables as 
determinants of current account movements. In this section, we discuss the possibility of 
other macroeconomic variables that may contribute to an increase in the fitness of the 
current empirical model. Some of the discussions in this section are meant to help improve 
future works. 
First, in addition to trade openness, financial openness is also an important 
determinant of current account movements. By interpreting financial openness as 
unrestricted international capital flow, Yan and Yang (2012) find a shift in causality 
between the current account and capital inflows after the global financial crisis. Chin and 
Ito (2007) find that financial market development causes developed countries to have 
smaller savings and thus a current account deficit, while the opposite is true for Asian 
countries. Furthermore, Tan et al. (2015) examine the effect of the structure of the 
financial system on current accounts. They find that a country with a fully developed 
capital market is more likely to run a current account deficit. In this study, the financial 
deepening variable, i.e., the ratio of broad money to GDP, is most closely related to 
financial openness; however, this variable is not statistically significant for most of the 
cases in either the BRICS or the G7 countries. Our study confirmed the finding in the 
literature that development in capital markets is more relevant for current account 
adjustment than the growth in bank lending or money supply are. 
 Second, the income distribution within a country matters for current accounts. 
Income inequality raises national savings and thus increases current accounts if the 
savings rate of the richer individuals is higher than that of the poorer individuals. However, 
there are a variety of theoretical models that can generate the reduction in the current 
account associated with income inequality; see Behringer and van Treeck (2018). Belabed 
et al. (2018) suggest that the US current account deficit can be explained in part by rising 
income inequality in the US. From investigating a sample of 20 countries, Behringer and 
van Treeck (2018) also find that income inequality leads to a decline in current accounts. 
In our study, the dependency ratio of young and elderly individuals may capture the part 
of the mechanism by which income distribution affects current accounts. The national 
savings rate should decline if the dependency ratio of elder (or dissaving) cohorts 
increases. Puzzlingly, in this study, the dependency ratio of elder cohorts on current 
accounts is positive for both BRICS and G7 countries whenever the ratio is statistically 
significant. One possible explanation for this contradiction between the theoretical 
predictions and empirical results in this paper may come from regressions based on the 
time-series of a single country rather than the panel framework used in Chin and Ito 
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(2007). As often experienced in many other applied works, demographical characteristics 
can only be captured in the difference in cross-sections of countries. 
Third, real exchange rates, or terms of trade, is not considered in this study. The 
effects of the terms of trade, i.e., relative price of exports and imports or relative price of 
tradable and non-tradable goods, on the current account is a classic issue in international 
macroeconomics. The so-called HLM effect works through the real income effect by 
which the terms of trade deterioration decreases the current account balance (Harberger, 
1950 and Laursen and Metzler, 1950). Svensson and Razin (1983) examined the effect of 
terms-of-trade changes on a small country’s current account under perfect international 
capital mobility. A temporary terms-of-trade deterioration implies a deterioration of the 
current account, whereas a permanent terms-of-trade deterioration has an uncertain effect 
on the current account. Gervais et al. (2016) analyze a large set of emerging countries 
over the period from 1975 to 2008. They indicate that real exchange rate adjustment 
contributed to reducing current account imbalances. Focusing on the non-tradable sector, 
as in the Balassa-Samuelson effect on the real exchange rate, Hoffmann (2013) claims 
that the present-value model with non-tradeable goods explains more than 70 percent of 
China’s current account variability over the period 1982-2007. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Current account adjustment became a classic macroeconomic issue in the 1950s 
and is still one of the important macroeconomic policy objectives today. Especially for 
fast-growing developing counties such as Brazil, China, India, Russia, and South Africa, 
a large current account imbalance can lead to an economic crisis for the worst case. In 
this study, we investigated the determinants of current account changes for these BRICS 
countries between 1983 and 2017. As an empirical model, we selected the Glick-Rogoff 
model, which emphasizes productivity shocks at home and in the world and fits well with 
developed economies in the 1970s and 1980s (Glick and Rogoff, 1985). However, the 
Glick-Rogoff model fits poorly when it is applied to fast-growing BRICS countries for 
the period including the global financial crisis. 
Productivity shocks are important determinants of current account movements; 
however, a set of global and country-specific productivity shocks alone cannot explain a 
country’s current account. A set of macroeconomic variables help to improve the fitness 
of regression for developing countries but can worsen the adjusted R-squared for euro 
countries. It is not surprising that different mechanisms of current account adjustment 
work for different groups of countries, i.e., developed and developing countries, because 
there are many differences in terms of monetary policy, exchange rate systems, tariffs and 
14 
 
trade regulations between the two groups. This result suggests that policymakers should 
search for a framework in which the current account adjusts through its own country-
specific mechanism. 
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Figure 1. Current Accounts of BRICS Countries 
 
Note: Current accounts are in terms of current billion US dollars. Source: World 
Development Indicators, the World Bank. 
 
Figure 2. Total Factor Productivity of BRICS Countries 
 
Note: Total factor productivity is normalized for unity in 2011 for each country. Source: 
World Development Indicators, the World Bank.  
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Table 1a. Basic Glick-Rogoff regression with TFP as country-specific shock and weighted 
average as global shock 
 
Note: Global shock is calculated as the weighted average of total factor productivity of 
the G7 and country-specific shocks as the country’s total factor productivity. 
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent the 
10, 5, and 1 percent statistical significance levels, respectively. 
 
Table 1b. Basic Glick-Rogoff regression with TFP as country-specific shock and principal 
component as global shock 
 
Note: Global shock is calculated as the first principal component of the total factor 
productivity of the G7 and country-specific shocks as each country’s total factor 
productivity. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
represent the 10, 5, and 1 percent statistical significance levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
Russia Brazil India China South Africa
Panel1 Period 1995-2008 1983-2008 1983-2008 1983-2008 1983-2008
Country-specific  -1.12(1.72)  -0.01(0.04) 0.04(0.07) 0.13(0.08)  -0.06(0.05)
Global 5.14(10.09) 0.91(0.40) **  -0.03(0.20) 0.40(0.26)  -0.38(0.22) *
Investment 0.10(0.09) 0.01(0.03)  -0.02(0.01) 0.06(0.01) ***  -0.10(0.02) ***
Number of obs 14 26 26 26 26
Adj R-squared -0.14 0.29 0.20 0.60 0.58
Panel2 Period 1995-2017 1983-2017 1983-2017 1983-2017 1983-2017
Country-specific 0.11(1.33)  -0.18(0.12) 0.27(0.15) * 0.17(0.18)  -0.14(0.09)
Global 15.17(9.56) 0.15(0.45)  -0.29(0.33) 0.62(0.78)  -0.20(0.70)
Investment  -0.02(0.05) 0.00(0.03)  -0.01(0.01)  -0.02(0.01) 0.00(0.02)
Number of obs 23 35 35 35 35
Adj R-squared -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.06
Russia Brazil India China South Africa
Panel1 Period 1995-2008 1983-2008 1983-2008 1983-2008 1983-2008
Country-specific  -1.23(1.58)  -0.00(0.04) 0.02(0.07) 0.14(0.09)  -0.08(0.05)
Global 0.16(0.28) 0.02(0.01) ** 0.00(0.01) 0.01(0.01) 0.00(0.01)
Investment 0.11(0.08)  -0.01(0.02)  -0.02(0.01) 0.06(0.01) ***  -0.07(0.02) ***
Number of obs 14 26 26 26 26
Adj R-squared -0.13 0.20 0.23 0.58 0.53
Panel2 Period 1995-2017 1983-2017 1983-2017 1983-2017 1983-2017
Country-specific  -0.21(1.39)  -0.18(0.12) 0.23(0.13) 0.16(0.18)  -0.15(0.10)
Global 0.30(0.25) 0.00(0.10) 0.00(0.01) 0.01(0.02) 0.01(0.02)
Investment  -0.02(0.05) 0.00(0.02)  -0.01(0.01)  -0.01(0.07) 0.00(0.02)
Number of obs 23 35 35 35 35
Adj R-squared -0.08 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.05
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Table 2a. Basic Glick-Rogoff regression with TFP residual as country-specific shock and 
weighted average as global shock 
 
Note: Global shock is calculated as the weighted average of total factor productivity of 
the G7 and country-specific shocks as the residual of each country’s total factor 
productivity on Global shock. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** represent the 10, 5, and 1 percent statistical significance levels, 
respectively. 
 
Table 2b. Basic Glick-Rogoff regression with TFP residual as country-specific shock and 
principal component as global shock 
 
Note: Global shock is calculated as the first principal component of the total factor 
productivity of the G7 and country-specific shocks as the residual of each country’s total 
factor productivity on global shock. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** represent the 10, 5, and 1 percent statistical significance levels, 
respectively. 
 
Russia Brazil India China South Africa
Panel1 Period 1995-2008 1983-2008 1983-2008 1983-2008 1983-2008
Country-specific  -1.12(1.72)  -0.01(0.04) 0.04(0.07) 0.13(0.08)  -0.06(0.05)
Global 4.10(10.52) 0.90(0.39) ** 0.01(0.22) 0.51(0.27) *  -0.44(0.20) **
Investment 0.10(0.09) 0.01(0.03)  -0.02(0.01) 0.06(0.01) ***  -0.10(0.02) ***
Number of obs 14 26 26 26 26
Adj R-squared -0.14 0.29 0.20 0.60 0.58
Panel2 Period 1995-2017 1983-2017 1983-2017 1983-2017 1983-2017
Country-specific 0.11(1.33)  -0.18(0.12) 0.27(0.15) * 0.17(0.18)  -0.14(0.09)
Global 15.31(9.32)  -0.04(0.51)  -0.03(0.34) 0.76(0.76)  -0.35(0.73)
Investment  -0.02(0.05) 0.00(0.03)  -0.01(0.01)  -0.00(0.01) 0.00(0.02)
Number of obs 23 35 35 35 35
Adj R-squared -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.06
Russia Brazil India China South Africa
Panel1 Period 1995-2008 1983-2008 1983-2008 1983-2008 1983-2008
Country-specific  -1.24(1.58)  -0.00(0.04) 0.02(0.07) 0.14(0.08)  -0.08(0.06)
Global  -0.32(0.71) 0.02(0.01) ** 0.01(0.01) 0.02(0.01) *  -0.00(0.01)
Investment 0.11(0.08)  -0.01(0.02)  -0.02(0.01) 0.06(0.01) ***  -0.07(0.02) ***
Number of obs 14 26 26 26 26
Adj R-squared -0.13 0.20 0.23 0.58 0.53
Panel2 Period 1995-2017 1983-2017 1983-2017 1983-2017 1983-2017
Country-specific  -0.22(1.39)  -0.18(0.12) 0.23(0.13) * 0.16(0.18)  -0.15(0.10)
Global 0.21(0.54)  -0.00(0.01) 0.02(0.02) 0.03(0.02)  -0.01(0.02)
Investment  -0.02(0.05) 0.00(0.02)  -0.01(0.01)  -0.00(0.01) 0.00(0.02)
Number of obs 23 35 35 35 35
Adj R-squared -0.08 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.05
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Table 3a. Modified Glick-Rogoff regression with TFP residual as country-specific shock 
and weighted average as global shock 
 
Note: Global shock is calculated as the weighted average of total factor productivity of 
the G7 and country-specific shocks as residual of each country’s total factor productivity 
on global shock. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** represent the 10, 5, and 1 percent statistical significance levels, respectively. 
 
  
Russia Brazil India China South Africa
Panel1 Period 1983-2008 1983-2008 1983-2008 1983-2008
Country-specific 0.01(0.03) 0.02(0.06) 0.02(0.08)  -0.13(0.04) **
Global 0.86(0.26) ***  -0.01(0.22)  -0.26(0.43)  -0.43(0.27)
Investment  -0.21(0.07) *** 0.00(0.08)  -0.19(0.15)  -0.14(0.10)
fdeep  -0.01(0.01)  -0.01(0.05)  -0.05(0.05)  -0.03(0.05)
reldepo 0.87(0.98) 2.76(3.20) 1.38(2.69)  -0.79(0.82)
reldepy  -0.15(0.08) 0.02(0.21) 0.02(0.12)  -0.05(0.03)
nfa/GDP 2.87(1.66) 1.50(13.68) 18.58(7.88) **
open 8.08(7.73)  -11.96(11.37)  8.12(5.10)  7.49(1.84) ***
Number of obs 26 26 26 26
Adj R-squared 0.60 0.29 0.69 0.68
Panel2 Period 2001-2017 1983-2016 1983-2015 1983-2017 1983-2017
Country-specific 7.07(4.46)  -0.23(0.12) * 0.10(0.10)  -0.21(0.14)  0.05(0.13)
Global 40.35(16.75) **  -0.44(0.65)  -0.25(0.34)  0.54(037)  -0.56(0.78)
Investment 0.31(0.26)  -0.26(0.08) ** 0.03(0.06)  0.02(0.03)  0.10(0.07)
fdeep  -0.03(0.03) 0.01(0.01)  -0.04(0.09)  -0.01(0.03)  -0.03(0.08)
reldepo  -0.21(0.22) 5.09(1.76) *** 0.95(7.51) 0.45(1.18)  -0.70(2.26)
reldepy  -0.37(0.13) ** 0.40(0.17) **  -0.09(0.47) 0.43(0.28)  0.08(0.06)
nfa/GDP 4.30(1.87) * 1.70(2.11) 5.69(21.77) 2.56(5.46)
open 13.77(12.05) 8.81(20.97)  -14.10(13.64)  24.99(7.79) ***  -6.68(7.64)
Number of obs 17 34 33 35 35
Adj R-squared 0.31 0.22 -0.02 0.24 -0.04
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Table 3b. Modified Glick-Rogoff regression with TFP residual as country-specific shock 
and principal component as global shock 
 
Note: Global shock is calculated as the first principal component of the total factor 
productivity of the G7 and country-specific shocks as the residual of each country’s total 
factor productivity on global shock. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** represent the 10, 5, and 1 percent statistical significance levels, 
respectively. 
  
Russia Brazil India China South Africa
Panel1 Period 1983-2008 1983-2008 1983-2008 1983-2008
Country-specific 0.01(0.04) 0.02(0.07) 0.02(0.08)  -0.14(0.04) ***
Global 0.01(0.01) ** 0.01(0.01)  0.00(0.01)  -0.00(0.01)
Investment  -0.26(0.08) *** 0.01(0.08)  -0.12(0.14)  -0.05(0.10)
fdeep  -0.01(0.01)  -0.01(0.05)  -0.02(0.05)  -0.06(0.04)
reldepo 1.65(1.00) 2.26(3.24) 0.12(2.64)  -1.70(1.26)
reldepy  -0.12(0.08)  -0.02(0.21) 0.02(0.12)  -0.05(0.04)
nfa/GDP 3.69(1.95) * 0.38(13.35) 16.13(7.25) **
open 3.64(7.63)  -12.22(11.27)  6.38(5.18) 8.09(2.16) ***
Number of obs 26 26 26 26
Adj R-squared 0.45 0.31 0.68 0.66
Panel2 Period 2001-2017 1983-2016 1983-2015 1983-2017 1983-2017
Country-specific 4.58(4.07)  -0.23(0.12) * 0.06(0.07)  -0.19(0.15)  0.00(0.13)
Global 2.51(1.78)  -0.01(0.01) 0.01(0.05)  -0.01(0.01)  -0.01(0.02)
Investment 0.31(0.26)  -0.25(0.10) *** 0.03(0.08)  0.02(0.03)  0.10(0.09)
fdeep  -0.02(0.03) 0.01(0.01)  -0.04(0.49)  -0.02(0.04)  -0.04(0.08)
reldepo  -0.15(0.21) 5.03(1.77) ***  -0.34(3.24)  0.36(1.21)  -0.75(2.63)
reldepy  -0.38(0.14) ** 0.40(0.17) **  -0.18(0.21)  0.30(0.28)  0.06(0.05)
nfa/GDP 3.96(1.88) * 1.85(2.10) 8.69(13.35)  -0.38(5.68)
open 16.74(13.05) 9.93(23.14)  -14.77(11.27)  23.92(7.52) ***  -5.76(7.32)
Number of obs 17 34 33 35 35
Adj R-squared 0.29 0.22 -0.04 0.20 -0.05
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Appendix A. List of variables 
 
Variable  Source  Description 
tfp   PWT9.1  TFP at constant national prices (2011=1) 
GDP  WDI  gross domestic product (current LCU) 
ca  WDI  current account balance (BoP, current US$) times 
official exchange rate (LCU per US$, period 
average) 
investment WDI  gross fixed capital formation (current LCU) 
plus changes in inventories (current LCU) 
aw1     weighted average of G7 countries’ TFP 
aw2     principal component of G7 countries’ TFP 
fdeep  WDI  financial deepening: broad money (% of GDP) 
reldepo  WDI  age dependency ratio, old (% of working-age 
  population) 
reldepy  WDI  age dependency ratio, young (% of working-age  
population) 
nfa           WDI net foreign assets (current LCU); Net foreign assets 
are the sum of foreign assets held by monetary 
authorities and deposit money banks minus their 
foreign liabilities. Data are in current local currency. 
open  WDI  [exports of goods and services (current LCU) +  
imports of goods and services (current LCU)]  
/GDP (current LCU) 
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Appendix B. 
Table B1a. Basic Glick-Rogoff regression with the TFP residual as country-specific shock 
and weighted average as global shock; sample adjusted to coincide with Table 3a 
 
Note: Global shock is calculated as the weighted average of total factor productivity of 
the G7 and country-specific shocks as the residual of each country’s total factor 
productivity on global shock. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** represent the 10, 5, and 1 percent statistical significance levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table B1b. Basic Glick-Rogoff regression with the TFP residual as country-specific shock 
and the principal component as global shock; sample adjusted to coincide with Table 3b 
 
Note: Global shock is calculated as the first principal component of the total factor 
productivity of the G7 and country-specific shocks as the residual of each country’s total 
factor productivity on global shock. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** represent the 10, 5, and 1 percent statistical significance levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
Russia Brazil India China South Africa
Panel2 Period 2001-2017 1983-2016 1983-2015 1983-2017 1983-2017
Country-specific 0.01(3.12)  -0.19(0.11) 0.26(0.15) * 0.17(0.18)  -0.14(0.09)
Global 14.62(13.29)  -0.15(0.48)  0.12(0.37) 0.76(0.76)  -0.35(0.73)
Investment  -0.02(0.06)  -0.00(0.03)  -0.00(0.02)  -0.00(0.01) 0.00(0.02)
Number of obs 17 34 33 35 35
Adj R-squared -0.13 0.00 -0.02 0.02 -0.06
Russia Brazil India China South Africa
Panel2 Period 2001-2017 1983-2016 1983-2015 1983-2017 1983-2017
Country-specific  -1.45(2.95)  -0.19(0.11) * 0.23(0.13) * 0.16(0.18)  -0.15(0.10)
Global  -0.29(1.27)  -0.01(0.11)  0.26(0.17) 0.03(0.02)  -0.01(0.02)
Investment  -0.03(0.06)  -0.01(0.03)  0.00(0.02)  -0.00(0.01) 0.00(0.02)
Number of obs 17 34 33 35 35
Adj R-squared -0.15 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05
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Table C1. Basic Glick-Rogoff regression for G7 countries with the TFP residual as country-specific shock and the principal component as 
global shock 
 
Note: Global shock is calculated as the first principal component of the total factor productivity of the G7 and country-specific shocks as 
the residual of each country’s total factor productivity on global shock. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** represent the 10, 5, and 1 percent statistical significance levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Canada France Germany Italy Japan United Kingdom United States
Panel1 Period 1983-2008 1983-2008 1983-2008 1983-2008 1983-2008 1983-2008 1983-2008
Country-specific 0.18(0.17)  -0.01(0.18)  -0.39(0.18) * 0.07(0.10)  -0.43(0.17) ** 0.05(0.12)  -0.57(0.15) ***
Global 0.49(0.39)  -0.44(0.30) 0.43(0.59)  -0.28(0.56) 0.67(0.39) *  -0.08(0.27)  -0.43(0.16) **
Investment 0.02(0.03)  -0.07(0.02) ** 0.07(0.07)  -0.05(0.03) 0.01(0.03)  -0.05(0.03)  -0.02(0.02)
Number of obs 26 26 26 26 26 26 26
Adj R-squared -0.02 0.16 0.15 0.08 0.28 -0.02 0.43
Panel2 Period 1983-2017 1983-2017 1983-2017 1983-2017 1983-2017 1983-2017 1983-2017
Country-specific 0.34(0.15) **  -0.06(0.17)  -0.33(0.18) * 0.03(0.14)  -0.30(0.14) ** 0.01(0.14)  -0.25(0.23)
Global 0.76(0.45)  -0.12(0.17) 0.46(0.29)  -0.59(0.38) 0.63(0.25) **  -0.05(0.35)  -0.76(0.27) ***
Investment  -0.01(0.02)  -0.02(0.02) 0.07(0.04) *  -0.02(0.03) 0.01(0.03)  -0.01(0.04)  -0.01(0.01)
Number of obs 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
Adj R-squared 0.21 -0.04 0.14 0.01 0.13 -0.10 0.34
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Table C2. Modified Glick-Rogoff regression for G7 countries with the TFP residual as country-specific shock and the principal component 
as global shock 
 
Note: Global shock is calculated as the first principal component of the total factor productivity of the G7 and the country-specific shocks 
as the residual of the country’s total factor productivity on global shock. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, 
**, and *** represent the 10, 5, and 1 percent statistical significance levels, respectively. 
Canada France Germany Italy Japan United Kingdom United States
Panel1 Period 1983-2008 1983-2008 1983-2008 1983-2008 1983-2008 1983-2008 1983-2008
Country-specific 0.13(0.11) 0.05(0.17)  -0.38(0.37) 0.11(0.15)  -0.24(0.31) 0.18(0.14)  -0.36(0.11) ***
Global 1.08(0.37) ***  -0.25(0.25) 0.58(0.70)  -0.38(0.57) 1.42(0.52) ** 0.07(0.32)  -0.29(0.22)
Investment 0.17(0.15)  0.02(0.14) 0.04(0.09)  -0.12(0.19) 0.25(0.19) 0.05(0.16) 0.01(0.04)
fdeep  -0.01(0.01)  -0.01(0.01) 0.05(0.04)
reldepo 0.50(0.28) * 0.34(0.17) * 0.10(0.47) 0.34(0.35) 0.27(0.36)  -0.06(0.82) 0.73(0.41) *
reldepy 0.77(0.43) * 0.56(0.53)  -0.14(0.62) 0.05(0.17) 0.49(0.57) 0.33(0.37) 0.11(0.44)
nfa/GDP 0.72(2.71) 3.33(4.82) 1.91(14.65) 5.04(5.66) 4.96(4.31)  -16.09(9.41) 10.41(17.13)
open  1.88(3.20)  -7.68(7.80)  -0.03(11.06)  -7.72(8.30)  -4.29(8.91) 1.40(9.40)  -1.64(9.15)
Number of obs 26 26 26 26 26 26 26
Adj R-squared 0.24 0.12 0.09 0.00 0.33 0.13 0.53
Panel2 Period 1983-2017 1983-2017 1983-2017 1983-2017 1983-2017 1983-2017 1983-2017
Country-specific 0.23(0.15)  -0.01(0.13)  -0.29(0.20)  -0.06(0.23)  -0.28(0.17)  -0.05(0.23)  -0.22(0.16)
Global 0.95(0.39) **  -0.15(0.15) 0.39(0.39)  -0.80(0.37) ** 0.88(0.37) **  -0.03(0.42)  -0.71(0.25) ***
Investment 0.08(0.14)  -0.00(0.09) 0.03(0.07)  -0.16(0.13) 0.14(0.08) * 0.01(0.15) 0.00(0.04)
fdeep  -0.02(0.01) 0.00(0.02) 0.09(0.06)
reldepo 0.07(0.21) 0.17(0.10) *  -0.10(0.30) 0.25(0.11) ** 0.12(0.07) 0.16(0.68) 0.08(0.09)
reldepy 0.34(0.39) 0.25(0.26)  -0.03(0.32) 0.06(0.15) 0.19(0.11) 0.36(0.38) 0.53(0.43)
nfa/GDP  -1.74(1.58) 1.66(4.35)  -4.53(5.81)  -1.63(5.88) 3.92(4.03)  -2.13(11.73) 6.33(13.42)
open 6.20(2.63) **  -5.28(5.41) 3.32(7.47)  -2.77(7.17)  -1.77(6.54) 2.27(10.22)  -0.74(3.99)
Number of obs 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
Adj R-squared 0.33 0.00 0.11 0.07 0.21 -0.23 0.57
